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Abstract
This paper discusses and reexamines Emperor Hirohito’s degree of
responsibility in Japan’s military aggression in China during the late 1920s and
1930s to the attack on Pearl Harbor in the United States during World War II.
Scholars have long debated the extent of Hirohito’s role as a warmonger due to his
ambiguous position as a head of state and the lack of primary evidence displaying
his actions and thoughts on the war. This paper will utilize the Constitution of the
Empire of Japan of 1889 (informally known as the Meiji Constitution) which
delineated the emperor’s supreme position in the government along with primary
sources by Hirohito’s aides and ministers referencing his thoughts on the war
situation and Hirohito’s personal statements. Scholars, particularly from a nonJapanese perspective, support the interpretation that Hirohito was legally
responsible for the war effort, based on the evidence of the articles stipulating the
emperor having divine authority and supreme command over the military. In reality,
his powers were limited to a ceremonial role due to the political body structured by
the oligarchs who had established the Meiji Constitution. From a personal aspect he
was opposed to Japan’s war efforts, but he was unable to use his influence to
prevent the outbreak of the war as he was compelled by his top advisors, ministers,
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and military leaders to limit his role to a ceremonial one and to support the war from
a national aspect as he thought it would serve the country’s best interests.

Japanese Terminology
Genro: Elder Japanese statesmen from the Meiji period acting as advisors to the
emperor who had the authority to appoint and dismiss prime ministers. A portion of
them was responsible in establishing the Meiji Constitution.
Kodo: “Imperial way,” an ultranationalist ideology revering the emperor and
advocating his imperial rule. It became prevalent in the 1930s with the rising
militarism.
Kokutai: “National essence” or “national polity.” Starting from the Meiji period, the
definition emphasized the emperor’s sovereignty and the values of an emperorcentered state, becoming a fundamental concept in Japan’s ruling system until the
surrender in 1945.
Seidan: “Imperial decision,” the decision announced by the emperor which was
considered to be sacred.
Showa tenno: “Showa emperor,” referring to Hirohito’s posthumous name. Showa is
the name of the period of Hirohito’s reign from 1926 to 1989.

3
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Introduction
Hirohito reigned as the 124th Emperor of Japan from 1926 to 1989,
overseeing the military aggression in China and the subsequent Pacific War against
Asia and the United States. For a long time, scholars in and out of Japan have been
engaged in an inconclusive and controversial debate on the emperor’s role in the
war and whether he should have been tried as a war criminal along with other
Japanese political and military leaders. Critics claimed Hirohito was legally
responsible for initiating the war, citing the Constitution of the Empire of Japan of
1889 (informally known as the Meiji Constitution, and hereafter referred to as such),
which articulated that the emperor had the ruling power over the country.
Furthermore, Hirohito issued an imperial decree leading to the surrender of Japan in
the Pacific War after the dropping of the two atomic bombs and the invasion of the
Soviet Union, demonstrating his ability to assert and impose his authority. The Meiji
Constitution and the imperial decree are provided as evidence by the critics that
Hirohito was the head of state and controlled the military, portraying him as an active
leader in instigating the war against China and the United States.1
On the other hand, there are those who argued that the emperor was not
responsible, pointing out that the articles specifying the emperor’s political and

1

Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: Harper Collins Publishers Inc.,

2000), 1.
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military authority in the Constitution were not fully carried out in practice, putting the
emperor in an ambiguous role as a head of state. As a result, Hirohito did not have
the influential authority to prevent military aggression in China and was unable to
interfere with the decision-making process in the government Cabinet during the
diplomacy with the United States. His recorded statements and speeches also hinted
that he was against the actions of the military and the decision to go to war with the
United States.2
Using the Meiji Constitution as a framework and analyzing the primary
sources of government ministers, military leaders, and advisors highlighting their
dialogues with the emperor, I reexamine the debate and argue that while the articles
in the Constitution represented the emperor, including Hirohito, as a head of state
with an active role and decision-making authority, what happened in practice was
that his imperial powers was relegated to a ceremonial one, due to the fact that the
genro intended to emphasize the imperial rule of Japan using the emperor’s name as
they controlled the governmental bureaucracy behind the scenes. Additionally, the
rise of militarism caused by acts of insubordination in China during the 1930s
overshadowed Hirohito’s assertion of his constitutional powers. On a personal
aspect, while Hirohito opposed the war efforts against China and the United States,

2

Kajiyama Shigeru, Showa tenno wo omou (Tokyo: Soushisha, 1990), 23-24.
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he perceived that it was for the survival of the state, served the nation’s interests and
preserved the kokutai. When Hirohito became aware that Japan was suffering more
losses than gains and the war situation was not improving, he took the initiative by
issuing a decree calling for the surrender and the end of the war.
Methodology
As this research involves the psychology behind Emperor Hirohito, primary
sources from his advisors, imperial attendants, military leaders, and ministers are
used, consisting of dialogues and statements mentioning or announced by Hirohito.
As of now, no records exist that Hirohito kept a diary or memoir, and the number of
archival sources pertaining to the emperor are extremely limited due to the restricted
access between the general public and the imperial family of Japan.3 The closest
source recording Hirohito’s statements is the Showa tenno dokuhakuroku (The
Showa Emperor Monologue) by Terasaki Hidenari, a diplomat based in the United
States who acted as a translator in Hirohito and General Douglas MacArthur’s
meeting after the surrender of Japan. The monologue reveals statements and
speeches made by Hirohito starting from the 1930s, although statements referencing

3

It is not clearly known if the sources were destroyed or lost during the wartime. However, there is a

possibility that some were kept confidentially to avoid political controversies. See “Emperor Showa
wanted to express ‘deep regret’ in speech, documents reveal,” NHK-World-Japan, Jan 23, 2020,
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/817/.
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political and military matters are scarce.
Several secondary sources written by Japanese and non-Japanese scholars
are used to analyze how Hirohito and his decisions were interpreted and evaluated.
To better understand the context and argument of the topic, two main secondary
sources in the Japanese language are used. They are Irokawa Daikichi’s Showa-shi
to tenno (The History of Showa and the Emperor) and Kajiyama Shigeru’s Showa
tenno wo omou (Remembering Emperor Showa). A traditional theoretical framework
is applied in writing this paper to evaluate Hirohito’s thoughts behind his actions.
Literature Review
Scholarly discussions about Emperor Hirohito’s war responsibility were not
prevalent until his death in 1989. Since then, academic scholars and historians from
various backgrounds have been divided on the emperor’s role. The Western outlook
tends to be critical, with scholars arguing that Hirohito was a decisive factor in
initiating the war against China and the United States. Herbert P. Bix, one of the
prominent critics and author of Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, highlights
that the emperor was an authoritarian leader who exercised significant influence on
the decision-making process in the 1931 Manchurian Incident and the subsequent
attack on Pearl Harbor, arguing that he had the imperial influence to prevent it. 4

4

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 12.
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Others presented Hirohito’s personal statements after the war as evidence of
how he felt responsible for the conflict. In his article, “Hirohito and General Douglas
MacArthur: The First Meeting as Documented by Showa tenno jitsuroku,” Peter
Mauch shows how Hirohito confiding to his advisers and subsequently to MacArthur
expressing his guilt and the desire to take responsibility, hence acknowledging the
role he played during the war.5 Peter Li, author of In Search of Justice: Japanese
War Crimes, uses a legal framework to argue that according to the Meiji Constitution,
Hirohito possessed the imperial power to rule the country and move the military at
his will, making him accountable for the outbreak of the armed conflicts and the war
crimes that occurred. Additionally, Li analyzes Hirohito’s Imperial Rescript on
Surrender in 1945 and points out that he did not express remorse or guilt over the
war.6 Peter Wetzler’s Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision
Making in Prewar Japan shifts the focus from legal and moral responsibilities of the
emperor to the imperial household, arguing that Hirohito wanted to preserve his

5

Peter Mauch, “Hirohito and General Douglas MacArthur: The First Meeting as Documented by

Showa tenno jitsuroku,”Diplomacy & Statecraft 28, no.4 (2017): 587-588.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2017.1386446.

6

Peter Li, “Hirohito’s War Crimes Responsibility: The Unrepentant Emperor,” in The Search of

Justice: Japanese War Crimes, ed. Peter Li (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), 6365.
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lineage and the kokutai. Therefore, he participated in the decision-making process of
the war efforts, sharing a responsibility with other political and military leaders in the
outbreak of war against China and the United States.7
On the other hand, Japanese scholars leaned more toward the idea of
Hirohito having a pacifist personality who cared for his people but was forced to
participate in the war efforts. Japanese scholars Irokawa Daikichi and Kajiyama
Shigeru stressed that Hirohito, his political powers being restricted by the Meiji
Constitution, was unable to control the military due to their acts of insubordination in
China. He expressed his concerns and worries of Japan getting involved in a largescale conflict with China and the United States.8,9 In Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific
War, author Noriko Kawamura takes a more balanced approach and reassesses the
two dominant positions she considers to be exaggerated – the emperor being a
pacifist constitutional monarch and an active commander during the war – arguing
that Hirohito was entrapped in an ambiguous political position which made it difficult
to draw the distinction between his personal opinions and his state decisions. Hence,

7

Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan

(Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press, 1998), 202.

8

Irokawa Daikichi, Showa-shi to Tenno (Tokyo: Iwanami Seminar Books, 1991), 157-160.

9

Kajiyama, Showa tenno wo omou, 23-24.
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Kawamura highlights that Hirohito was neither a staunch pacifist nor an aggressive
militarist.10 The historiography looks to be an inconclusive debate between the two
sides, but with the possibilities that more sources on the emperor could be unearthed
in the future, there is hope that Hirohito’s true role in the war can be comprehended.
The Meiji Constitution
Before the American-drafted and current Constitution of 1947 (still in effect
today) that stipulated the emperor as the “symbol of the state and the unity of the
people”, the Meiji Constitution was established in 1889, using a combination of
Prussian-influences and Japanese imperial models. Several articles in the
Constitution mentioned the role of the emperor as the head of the state. They were:
Article I: “The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of
Emperors unbroken for ages eternal”.
Article III: “The Emperor is sacred and inviolable”.
Article IV: “The Emperor combined in his being the supreme rights of rule”.
Article XI: “The Emperor has the supreme command of the army and navy”.
Article XII: “The Emperor determines the organization and the peace standing of the
army and navy”.

10

Noriko Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War (Seattle: University of Washington Press,

2015), 12-13.
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Article XIII: “The Emperor makes war, makes peace, and conclude treaties”.11,12
These articles delineated the emperor as an influential supreme leader in managing
diplomatic relationships with other states and commander of the military. However,
the Constitution also ensured the emperor does not shoulder all of the
responsibilities. Article LV “called for the various ministers of state to advise and
assist the emperor within their respective areas of responsibility”.13 This signified that
the ministers had to reach a consensus on decision and policymaking, which would
be forwarded to the emperor who would give the green light to pass it through.
Nevertheless, with the majority of articles referring to the emperor as the supreme
commander of Japan, scholars critical of Hirohito have pointed out that he had
utilized these powers to initiate military aggression against China and the United
States.
However, what happened in practice, as it developed over the course of the
Meiji period, was rather different. The Meiji Constitution was created by the genro,
and in accordance with Article I and LV, the genro intended to stress the imperial

11

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 5.

12

Li, “Hirohito’s War Crimes Responsibility,” 63.

13

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 5.
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tradition that the state of Japan was “reigned” by the emperor eternally. 14 At the
same time, the genro handled the administrative affairs of the government body not
only to reduce the emperor’s workload but also to avoid having him shoulder all the
responsibilities. Hence, the Constitution was structured in a way that leaned toward a
mixture of absolute and constitutional monarchy. As the genro became took charge
of domestic and foreign politics – some of them having a military background that
gave them the authority to mobilize troops - the emperor’s role was reduced into a
passive one of not being able to directly command the ministers or the military, but
he was able to attend and discuss political and military decisions.15 This practice
demonstrated that issuing government policies under the name of the emperor was a
façade to emphasize the imperial will that sought to safeguard and serve the national
interests of Japan.16
Since 1890, an imperial policy known as the Imperial Rescript on Education
was issued by Hirohito’s grandfather, Emperor Meiji, calling for the Japanese people
to serve their country and protect the emperor. The Rescript announced that “Should

14

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 182.

15

Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, 32.

16

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 5.
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emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and
maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth.”17
Along with the imperial will, this rescript became the building block of the kokutai that
Hirohito strongly desired to preserve regardless of his personal convictions. He
associated the imperial household and the state of Japan as one entity, and if either
one collapses he perceived that it would mean the end of the country.18 In the 1930s,
the definition of kokutai was officially formalized by the Ministry of Education, who
published a booklet called Kokutai no hongi (Fundamentals of our national polity). A
revised version on the Imperial Rescript on Education, it called for Japanese citizens
to “serve the emperor and to receive the emperor’s great august Will…[Japan] is a
great family nation, and the Imperial Household is the head family of the subjects
and the nucleus of national life.”19
Hence, the scholarly view of Hirohito being legally responsible for the war was
partly derived from the fact that the articles in the Constitution denoted him as a

17

Cabinet Office of Japan, Kyouiku ni kansuru chokugo. Japan, 1890, National Archives of Japan

Digital Archive. https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/meta/Detail_F0000000000000087481
(accessed February 11, 2020).

18

Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, 183-184.

19

Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, 68.
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supreme commander of the country. However, as the contradiction between theory
and practice of the Constitution has revealed, the role of supreme commander has
been misinterpreted at a face value.
The 1930s: Early Years of Reign and the Rising Military Influence
When Hirohito took the imperial throne in 1926, Japan was becoming one of
the major economic and military power states in the world along with Great Britain
and the United States.20 Since the 1890s, Japan experienced military victories over
China and Russia, becoming a colonial power by gaining Taiwan from the former and
had also annexed Korea. World War I provided Japan an opportunity to further
extend its sphere of influence into China, but its efforts were inhibited by the Allied
powers. Hence, the Japanese military devised other ways to gain control of China,
causing political tensions.21 In 1927, a year into Hirohito’s reign where he was still
new to the throne, China’s Nationalist Party led by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
unified the country that had been divided and ruled by local warlords, a situation
Japan had taken advantage of. To protect their people and interests residing in
China, Japan sent troops to fight against Chiang’s army, ushering in the series of

20

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 141.

21

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 146-147.
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military skirmishes that gradually culminated into a large-scale conflict.
Also in the 1920s, Japan faced domestic difficulties and was plagued
by an economic crisis following the destruction of the capital Tokyo by the Great
Kanto Earthquake of 1923 and subsequent bank closures.22 This was aggravated by
the Great Depression beginning in 1929, when Japan’s economy, which had been
heavily dependent on imports and exports between Europe and the United States,
was deeply affected.23 As dissatisfaction toward the civilian government for being
ineffective in solving the nation crises surfaced, various sociopolitical groups and
ideologies surfaced to with proposed solutions to Japan crises. A debate emerged on
how the kokutai should be upheld. Nationalists conceptualized the “imperial way” the kodo - to bring effective reforms to the country by using the emperor’s powers. It
signified the ideology that the Empire of Japan was manifested in the emperor
himself and, hence, rule with the emphasis on Japanese traditions and moral codes
by abolishing Western sociopolitical ideologies.24 Kodo became increasingly

22

Osanaga Kanroji, Hirohito: An Intimate Portrait of the Japanese Emperor (Los Angeles: Gateway

Publishers, 1975), 111.

23

Ben – Ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26, Incident, (New

Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1973), 3-4.

24

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 11-12.

15

Published by UW Tacoma Digital Commons, 2020

15

Access*: Interdisciplinary Journal of Student Research and Scholarship, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 5

prevalent in the military, as it sought to displace the civilian government that had
been ruling Japan in a Western-influenced liberal approach. These national issues
created a turbulent era for Hirohito as he observed the increasing military influence
both in domestic and foreign politics.25
On a personal level, Hirohito hoped to reign over the country by leaning more
toward a constitutional monarchy and with relative peace, influenced by his 1921 trip
to Europe when he was a Crown Prince. There he witnessed the close relationship
King George V of Britain had with his citizens as well as the ruins of cities caused by
the destruction of World War I.26 However, the political situation during his reign
prompted him, reluctantly, to think otherwise. As discussed previously, mentioned in
the Meiji Constitution, the emperor supposedly had supreme command over the
military, but because of his relegation to a ceremonial role contributed by Article LV
stating that political duties were to be carried out by ministers, Hirohito had no direct
control of the army who were moving at their discretion.
In 1927, a military skirmish occurred between the Japanese forces and
Chiang’s army, who had recently unified China. When Hirohito was signing an

25

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 146-147.

26

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 144-145.
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agreement allowing Japanese troops to enter China so as to protect Japanese
residents there, Hirohito expressed concern of a possible armed conflict at a larger
scale. One of Hirohito’s imperial attendants, Osanaga Kanroji, heard from the
emperor’s aide that as Hirohito was about to sign the document, he hesitated for a
while and questioned: “How will the Japanese residents be evacuated safely? Won’t
this be a repetition of the Nikolaevsk Incident?”, referring to the 1920 Siberian
expedition during the Russian civil war that killed a large number of Japanese
nationals. This episode demonstrated to Osanaga that the “mind of the emperor was
always focused on the welfare of the people.”27
A year later in 1928, a group of army officers from the Japanese Kwantung
Army, who were stationed in China, instigated an explosion as an act of
insubordination with the intention of extending Japanese influence in Northeast
China. The explosion killed the Chinese warlord Zhang Zuolin, the governor of
Manchuria. Hirohito was upset that the army had acted without the government’s
permission and that requested prime minister Tanaka Giichi investigate the incident

27

Osanaga, Hirohito, 111-112.
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and identify the culprits.28,29 Tanaka promised to emperor that the perpetrators would
be severely punished.30 However, upon identifying the culprits, a group of military
leaders and right-wing nationalists expressed their opposition to the severity of the
punishment, pressurizing Tanaka to report to the emperor that the perpetrators’
punishments had been reduced to a lighter one.31 In response, Hirohito reprimanded
Tanaka: “What you have reported to me initially is different, isn’t it?!” He then told his
imperial attendant that “I do not understand a single thing Prime Minister Tanaka is
telling me. I do not wish to hear from him again.”32
Subsequently, Tanaka and his cabinet announced their resignation,
demonstrating how the emperor had used his imperial authority to influence the
government. Genro Saionji Kinmochi was concerned about this movement and
advised to Hirohito: “For Your Majesty to directly compel a prime minister to resign is

28

Kojima Noboru, Tenno 2: Manshuu Jihen. vol. 2 (Tokyo: Bungeishunjuu, 1981), 52.

29

Kawai Yahachi, Showa shoki no tenno to kyuuchuu: Jijuu jicho Kawai Yahachi nikki [Dai 2 kan], vol.

2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), 221.

30

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 148.

31

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 148.

32

Harada Kumao, Saionjikou to seikyoku: Dai 2 kan – Ji Showa 6 nen 7 gatsu shi Showa 8 nen 1

gatsu. vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1950), 10-11.
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not ideal in accordance to the Constitution.”33 Saionji, the last surviving genro, had
been an mentor of Hirohito, teaching him the significance of upholding the imperial
family and tradition for the country.34 Heeding Saionji’s advice, Hirohito, from then
on, refrained from voicing opinions that would significantly influence politics.35 As the
ringleaders involved in the explosion incident were let off with a light punishment, it
emboldened a portion of the military to believe they could act without permission
from their commanding officers and the emperor.36
Although Hirohito expressed his concerns whenever he was able to, the
international situation gradually escalated into a conflict that forced Hirohito to move
away from a more pacifist position. Emboldened by the assassination of Zhang
Zuolin, in 1931, officers in the Japan’s Kwantung Army, without the tacit agreement
of the generals in the Tokyo headquarters, staged an explosion - another act of
insubordination - that became a casus belli in Northeast China, known as the
Manchurian Incident. In the aftermath of the incident, the Army seized control of

33

Kawai Yahachi, Showa shoki no tenno to kyuuchuu: Jijuu jicho Kawai Yahachi nikki [Dai 3 kan] vol.

3 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1993), 113.

34

Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 2-3.

35

Kajiyama, Showa tenno wo omou, 19.

36

Irokawa, Showa-shi to Tenno, 149-150.
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Manchuria and set up the puppet state Manchukuo, which the League of Nations
called an act of aggression and refused to recognize.
Upon hearing about the incident, Hirohito sought an explanation from the
Army General Staff, asking why the army had entered Manchuria without his
permission.37 An imperial conference consisting of the ministers discussing on the
incident was subsequently held. They reached a consensus on how the military
commands were not obeyed. The emperor reportedly stated that the government
was making the effort to quell the situation, implying his demonstration of support for
the ministers’ consensus.38,39 However, this action drew ire from a group of military
officers in the Army intending to expand their influence in China as they interpreted
that the government was attempting to sway the emperor’s opinion.40 The ministers
were prompted to prove that this was not the case. Kido Koichi, one of the ministers
in the government who later become the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the chief
advisor for Hirohito, noted in his diary that “[U]nless there is no alternative, it would

37

Kido Koichi, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 1931-45: Selected Translations into English (Maryland:

University Publications of America, 1984), 5.

38

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 237.

39

Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 5.

40

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 237.
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be best not to have the Emperor’s word from now.”41 The conference concluded that
Hirohito was to accept the actions of the army. Cases pursuing the relationship of the
emperor and the military should be stopped so as to avoid conflict with the latter. The
way the Manchurian Incident was dealt with demonstrated how the military’s power
had more influence than the governmental Cabinet.42 From this point onward until
1945, the military would be in control of Japan’s foreign policy; the Manchurian
Incident had led to what historian Peter Duus called the “diplomatic revolution”.43
With the chain of command between the imperial palace, government, and the
military in disorder state, some of the military officers – in another act of
insubordination - took matters in their own hands to eliminate targets who were
against the war efforts in China. On February 26, 1936, a group of nationalist army
officers, assassinated several ministers and nearly killed the prime minister. The
officers proclaimed the Showa Restoration – the aim to overthrow the current
political order and to put the emperor back into his authoritative imperial role, thereby
restoring the kokutai. They claimed to be acting for the sake of Emperor Hirohito.44

41

Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 5.

42

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 237.

43

Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976), 205.

44

Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 298.
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Realizing the incident had cost the lives of prominent men and had the potential to
tarnish Japan’s reputation in the world, Hirohito took a tougher stance on the
military.45 He rebuked Kido, “whatever [the army officers’] excuses are, I am
displeased with this incident. It has brought disgrace on the fundamental character of
our kokutai [national polity].”46 Kido noted that the emperor said “Suppress the
insurgents as soon as possible. Hold your post with sincerity until peace and order
are restored.”47 This exemplified Hirohito’s use of his constitutional powers of having
supreme command over the military, although the circumstances were
unconventional given that Hirohito wanted to assure that he was not the political
leader that the army officers claimed to be advocating for.48 In addition, his vehement
response to the incident portrayed his pacifist characteristic as he did not want his
country to be engaged in a civil conflict. Hirohito told Honjo Shigeru, his chief aidede-camp, that the senior statesman and generals whom I have trusted the most as
my hands and feet have been killed…Their actions have violated the
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constitution…blackened the national polity (kokutai) and defiled its purity. At this time
the army should be cleansed thoroughly, and steps should be taken to prevent such
a disgraceful incident from ever occurring again.49
However, Honjo, an army officer himself and sympathetic to the incident, did not take
heed of Hirohito’s advice, maintaining the military’s status quo.50
Diplomacy with the United States
Following the outbreak of the full-scale Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937
and the subsequent invasion of French Indochina in 1941 that Hirohito and the
Japanese civilian government was unable to prevent due to the results of the military
skirmishes occurring since the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the United States imposed
a trade embargo on Japan, cutting off their oil supply. Importing 80% of its oil from
U.S. owned oil companies, the embargo was to compel Japan to withdraw their
troops from China.51 During this period from 1938 to 1941, Army and Navy generals,
along with the ministers in the Cabinet, were discussing the possibility of attacking
the United States in order to cripple the U.S. Naval fleet and morale.52
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Hirohito had hoped to make peace with Great Britain and the United States,
but the intensifying war situation in China initiated by the army and exacerbated by
Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro made it difficult for Hirohito to voice his concerns.
Konoe had escalated matters by advocating for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity
Sphere and forming the one-party state of the Imperial Rule Assistance
Association.53 Hirohito opposed the invasion of French Indochina, reminding Army
Minister Sugiyama Hajime: “Do not provoke an armed conflict. Prioritize efforts to
settle the situation as peacefully as possible.”54 However, knowing he could not
directly intervene in the war decisions, Hirohito started to raise concerns about
Japan’s survival. He told the military department that the French Indochina operation
should be treated with caution for the sake of national policy, and asked Kido, Lord
Keeper of the Privy Seal, whether the suggestion to invade both the Soviet Union
and Southeast Asia would be sustainable, demonstrating his priority toward the
country’s interests.55,56
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Hirohito remained adamant in opposing a war with the United States, and
expressed his dissatisfaction with Konoe’s diplomatic approach on negotiating with
the United States on the surface but building up the military behind the scenes.
Hirohito requested Konoe prioritize negotiations over armed conflict, but Konoe
responded that it was impossible to do so.57 Kido explained the rationale of going to
war by stating how the oil supplies in Japan would only last for another one to two
years following the embargo. Hence, he highlighted that Japan should get hold of
resources in Southeast Asia, while maintaining its peaceful relations with the United
States using a strategic approach.58
On September 6, 1941, an imperial conference was held to discuss the
directions Japan was going to take toward Great Britain and the United States,
consisting of the decision to attack Pearl Harbor.59 A day before, Hirohito had looked
into the agenda report for the conference, remarking to Konoe that the process
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appeared to be using war as a means to negotiate, and wanted to question the Army
and Navy general staffs – Sugiyama and Nagano Osami respectively - on the
rationale. Konoe reiterated that the government would engage in diplomatic
negotiations, and if it failed, they would start preparing for the war.60
Hirohito asked Sugiyama if he was confident about being able to resolve the
war efforts against the United States. Sugiyama said he would plan to resolve in
three months. Hearing this, Hirohito probed Sugiyama: “You were the Army Minister
during the outbreak of the Second-Sino Japanese War. I remember you said it will be
resolved in a month. But it has been four years now. Why has it not concluded yet?
And on what basis do you say that you can resolve the war with the United States in
three months?”61 Sugiyama was unable to answer, and Nagano offered an
explanation stating they would do their best to reach a negotiation, but would resort
to force if diplomacy breaks down, encouraging Hirohito to agree with the
conference’s agenda. In response, Hirohito asked: “The military command will place
emphasis on the diplomacy. Is that right?” Both of the generals replied affirmatively.62
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The next day Hirohito told Kido he wanted to ask some questions in the
conference council, but Kido said that the council president would ask the crucial
questions regarding Japan’s policy to the United States, and advised the emperor
there was no need to do so, possibly reflecting a concern that Hirohito might go
against the Constitution by politically influencing the government again.63 Later that
day, Kido asked the emperor about the progress of the conference, and Hirohito
replied “that the supreme command had not answered the question of the president
of the Privy Council as to whether they were attaching importance to the diplomatic
negotiations with the U.S.A.”64 Disappointed, Hirohito recited a poem written by
Emperor Meiji, his grandfather, on the country’s predicament: “In a world where all
the seas are brethren, why do wind and wave so stridently clash?” Then, he
announced to the conference: “I make it a rule to read this poem by Emperor Meiji
every day, with the hope of emulating his spirit of peace. However, matters have now
reached this truly regrettable state.”65 This was seen from the audience in the
conference as an attempt by Hirohito to stop the outbreak of the war, portrayed in the
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medium of poetry to ensure he was not making political statements to sway
governmental decisions, and also to demonstrate his hopeless appeal for peace.
Ultimately, the ambiguous power relationship between the imperial palace,
government and the military command, which resulted from the uncontrolled power
the latter had since the Manchurian Incident and the contradictory practices in the
Constitution, undermined the consensus regarding diplomacy with the United
States.66 This portrayed Japan attempting to reach a negotiation with the United
States on the surface while making war preparations behind the scenes. Konoe, who
took a moderate position on the war situation, resigned as prime minister shortly
thereafter due to his failure to keep up on the deadline for going to war.67 He was
replaced by General Tojo Hideki who had been pushing for the war efforts. With this
change in leadership, Hirohito gradually accepted the fact that Japan was preparing
for war against the United States.
On December 1, an imperial conference was held to formally declare war
against Great Britain and the United States, with Hirohito announcing the imperial
order of approval. A day before, Kido noted in his diary that “The Emperor said that,
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to his great anxiety…[he had hoped] for the avoidance of war as much as
possible.”68A week later, Japanese army forces commenced the attack on Pearl
Harbor, initiating war with the United States. Osanaga noted that “when Tojo and
Sugiyama reported the complete success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the emperor
sat impassive, showing no signs of gratification.”69 From then on to the last days of
the Pacific War, the emperor made no references to the pacificism that he had
voiced before, instead focusing all he could on the war situation to preserve Japan.70
The Imperial Decision to Surrender and Hirohito’s Reflection
In mid-1942, following the defeat from the Battle of Midway, Japan’s military
strategy turned into a defensive one that began to favor the United States. With
further major defeats beginning in 1945 such as the Battle of Iwo Jima and Okinawa,
Japan was pushed to the losing edge of the war. A faction of the government
advocated for the end of the conflict as soon as possible. Hirohito, observing the
hopeless situation his country was entrapped in, began to voice his concerns as
well.71 He told his military aide that “I believe that this war is certainly winnable if we

68

Kido, The Diary of Marquis Kido, 321.

69

Osanaga, Hirohito, 129.

70

Bix, Emperor Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 434-435.

71

Kawamura, Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War, 141-142.

29

Published by UW Tacoma Digital Commons, 2020

29

Access*: Interdisciplinary Journal of Student Research and Scholarship, Vol. 4 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 5

make our best efforts, but I am anxious about whether or not the people will able to
endure until then.”72 Kido thought the only way for Japan to end the war was to
surrender unconditionally, reporting to Hirohito on the grave military situation and
suggesting he should use his imperial authority, the seidan, to end the war when it
became necessary.73
With the defeat of Germany in May and the Potsdam Declaration demanding
Japan’s unconditional surrender in July, Hirohito “earnestly [urged] concluding peace
with the Allies” despite the army’s insistence on fighting.74 However, as was the case
with the failed diplomacy with the United States before the war, the lack of
consensus between the military and government caused tensions and delays in the
decision-making process regarding surrender. In August 1945, the two atomic bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, combined with the Soviet Union’s declaration against
Japan, became the catalyst for the ending the war.75 Hirohito, with the help of his
closest advisers, required a seidan so that the military had to obey the emperor’s
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orders, thereby forcing a national consensus.76 The reason the seidan was not used
to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor was due to the fact that the majority of the
government at the time, dominated by military leaders, was leaning toward war, and
Hirohito, who was not supposed to use his personal opinions to influence politics,
agreed to it in the name of preserving the kokutai. Now that the kokutai was on the
brink of disintegration, and with a handful of imperial and political officials advocating
for peace, the advisors used this dire predicament to turn Hirohito’s opinion into a
state decision.77 At the imperial conference on August 14, Hirohito appealed to
everyone, with tears in his eyes that “If we continue the war, Japan will be altogether
destroyed… I cannot express the sorrow I feel as I think of all who were killed on the
battlefield or in the homeland and of their bereaved families… I will do everything in
my power to help .”78
The next day, the imperial rescript on surrender was broadcast on the radio,
and for the first time, the Japanese people heard the voice of their emperor. In the
broadcast, Hirohito announced that “the war situation has not developed necessarily
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to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against
her interest…should we continue to fight, it would only result in an ultimate collapse
of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human
civilization.”79
When General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers who oversaw the occupation of Japan after its defeat, met with Hirohito, he
was astonished by the emperor’s willingness to take responsibility for the war.
MacArthur recalled that Hirohito told him: “I accept total responsibility for initiating the
war in the political and military aspects. I leave it up to your representative of the
country to decide on my judgment.”80 Although scholars debate the validity of the
emperor’s statements, it is likely that Hirohito did feel a sense of guilt for not being
able to use his imperial authority to prevent the military aggressions but was able to
end the war.81 Tajima Michiji, one of the stewards in the Imperial Household,
possessed documents on how Hirohito wanted to express his remorse over the war
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to the public. Hirohito told Tajima that “the military, the government, the public – they
all have things to feel remorse for, such as overlooking the military’s arbitrary
actions.”82
Influenced by the fact that Hirohito did not act accordingly on what was
stipulated in the Meiji Constitution and his personal guilt, MacArthur decided it was
best not to criminalize the emperor for war crimes, in addition to the reason that “his
indictment will unquestionably cause a tremendous convulsion among the Japanese
people, the repercussions of which cannot be overestimated. He is a symbol which
unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will disintegrate”.83 Hirohito was then
prompted to renounce his status as a living god and declare his humanity in his
second radio broadcast on January 1, 1946. The revised Constitution drafted by the
United States changed the emperor into a “symbol of the state and of the unity of
people”, stripping the imperial institution of political powers.
Conclusion
Due to the limited number of primary sources pertaining to Emperor Hirohito
and his course of actions during wartime, along with the inconclusive scholarly
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debates which are partially clouded by political positions, the true extent of Hirohito’s
accountability might never be known. The articles written in the Meiji Constitution
portray the emperor as being legally responsible for military actions, but this paper
has demonstrated that in keeping with the pattern established by his grandfather
Emperor Meiji, Hirohito did not perform the roles to the fullest extent, contributed by
the genro’s intent to place the emperor into a de jure position. Emperor Meiji had a
close working relationship with the genro, but most of them were gone by the time of
Hirohito’s reign, prompting Hirohito to consult with other advisors, ministers and
military leaders. Additionally, the military’s acts of insubordination in China in the
1930s emboldened them and increased their influence in the Japanese government,
weakening and overshadowing the Cabinet’s decision-making powers. This became
apparent in the diplomacy toward the United States in 1941 where the imperial
household, the government and the military were working at odds with one another,
with the military eventually prevailing.
From a personal dimension, Hirohito had long been against the war efforts,
influenced by his tour of post-World War I Europe. However, announcing his opinions
to influence politics was deemed to be against the Constitution, and thus he had to
remain as an observer for most of the time, except during the war, so as to preserve
Japan’s kokutai. In retrospect, Hirohito expressed guilt and remorse over the war,
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believing he should shoulder all the responsibilities.84
Understanding that Emperor Hirohito acted more as a ceremonial leader
helps to reduce the biased view of him as an active warmonger. This perspective
also shows that the initiation of military aggressions was mostly attributed to the
army and navy, and to a certain extent, the government. While this is not to claim
that Hirohito is completely absolved, the unwarranted prejudice toward the Japanese
imperial household in contemporary society could be mitigated to clear the
inaccurate representation of an imperial ruler that was aggressive and warlike.
Additionally, it makes the public opinion realize that the head of state is not always
necessarily the head of government, and that the issue of accountability does not
solely focus on a single leader – but must also consider other figures or movements
surrounding the leader.
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